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ARTICLES
THE BUSINESS PURPOSE TEST IN SECTION 355
DISTRIBUTIONS: MAJOR PITFALLS FOR CLOSE
CORPORATION PLANNING
Brenda D. Crocker*
Since 1918, Congress has recognized the economic necessity of
stimulating growth in the business sector by encouraging productive corporate divisions. The unhappy task of more than sixty
years has been to draft a statute which maximizes flexibility while
precluding tax avoidance abuses. Charting its way by piecemeal
legislation, Congress appears to have intended tax-free treatment
for stock distributions pursuant to corporate divisions motivated
by reasonable business needs. Curiously, although Congress clearly
has assumed that a valid business purpose must be the primary
motivation for such transactions, it never has expressly addressed
the matter by statute. Instead, it has devised numerous complex
requirements and left the development of this capstone concept to
the Treasury Department and the courts. In so doing, Congress has
fostered unwarranted uncertainty in the business community and
indirectly encouraged abuse and economic waste.
The business purpose doctrine was introduced by the United
States Supreme Court in 1935. Its purpose was to defeat earnings
and profits bail-out schemes through an articulation of the spirit of
Congress' divisions and distributions enactments. Since 1935, the
courts and the Internal Revenue Service have expended considerable effort in an attempt to hone the doctrine so as to limit tax-free
status to distributions which are motivated by business exigencies.
Although several identifiable decisional categories now cover the
majority of possible factual settings, several troublesome areas remain. The purpose of this paper is to identify both the resolved
* B.A., Agnes Scott College, 1971; J.D., Washington & Lee University, 1980.
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and unresolved major issues which the close corporation shareholders or planner must face in devising a section 355 transaction.
I.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CORPORATE DISIONS AND
DISTRIBUTIONS

A cursory review of the legislative history behind section 355
should facilitate an understanding of its targets and limitations.
The Revenue Act of 1918 was Congress's first attempt at encouraging corporate divisions. Although it provided for tax-free treatment
for split-ups only,1 Congress clearly recognized the economic benefit of encouraging corporate divisions with the assets remaining in
corporate solution.2 Expanding this theme in the Revenue Act of
1924, Congress elevated split-offs3 and spin-offs4 to this preferred
1. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(a)-(b), 40 Stat. 1060 (current version at I.R.C. §
358). This provision read as follows:
(a) That for the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived or loss sustained from the
sale or other disposition of property, real, personal, or mixed, the basis shall be(1) In the case of property acquired before March 1, 1913, the fair market price or
value of such property as of that date; and
(2) In the case of property acquired on or after that date, the cost thereof; or the
inventory value, if the inventory is made in accordance with section 203.
(b) When property is exchanged for other property, the property received in exchange shall for the purpose of determining gain or loss be treated as the equivalent
of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if any; but when in connection with the
reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation a person receives in place of
stock or securities owned by him new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par
or face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the exchange, and the
new stock or securities received shall be treated as taking the place of the stock,
securities, or property exchanged.
When in the case of any such reorganization, merger or consolidation the aggregate
par or face value of the new stock or securities received is in excess of the aggregate
par or face value of the stock or securities exchanged, a like amount in par or face
value of the new stock or securities received shall be treated as taking the place of the
stock and securities exchanged, and the amount of the excess in par or face value
shall be treated as a gain to the extent that the fair market value of the new stock or
securities is greater than the cost (or if acquired prior to March 1, 1913, the fair
market value as of that date) of the stock or securities exchanged.
Arguably, Congress also intended to include split-offs in this provision. See H.R. REP. No.
179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924).
3. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 203(b)(2), (h), (i), 43 Stat. 256 (current version at
I.R.C. §§ 355, 368). These subsections read as follows:
(b)(2) No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party
to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely
for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the
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status.
The difficulty with these statutes was that they vested a ritualistic procedure with preferred status. Providing neither admonition
nor express protection against bail out intent, this broad exemption invited facile bail out of corporate earnings and profits. A corporation engorged with accumulated earnings or liquid assets only
needed to transfer these items to a new corporation, distributing
the new corporation's stock to the former corporation's shareholders. The shareholders then could sell the stock or liquidate the new
corporation, receiving capital gains treatment on the "bailed out"
assets in lieu of paying ordinary tax rates on a dividend. 5
In full compliance with the letter of the statutes, the taxpayer in
Gregory v. Helvering6 attempted just such a bail out. Mrs. Gregory, the sole shareholder of United Mortgage Corporation, caused
the corporation to transfer its liquid assets to the newly formed
reorganization.
(h) As used in this section and sections 201 and 204(1) The term "reorganization" means (A) a merger or consolidation (including the
acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a
majority of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or substantially all the properties of another corporation), or (B) a transfer by a
corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after
the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation
to which the assets are transferred, or (C) a recapitalization, or (D) a mere change in
identity, form, or place of organization, however effected.
(2) The term "a party to a reorganization" includes a corporation resulting from a
reorganization and includes both corporations in the case of an acquisition by one
corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of the
total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation.
(i) As used in this section the term "control" means the ownership of at least 80
per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.
4. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 203(b)(2), (c), (h), 43 Stat. 256 (current version at
I.R.C. § 355). Section 203(c) reads as follows:
(c) If there is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a shareholder
in a corporation a party to the reorganization, stock or securities in such corporation
or in another corporation a party to the reorganization, without the surrender by such
shareholder of stock or securities in such a corporation, no gain to the distributee
from the receipt of such stock or securities shall be recognized.
5. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 200-203, 208, 43 Stat. 254 (current version at
I.R.C. §§ 351-368).
6. 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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Averill Corporation, whose stock was then distributed to her.' Mrs.
Gregory immediately liquidated Averill Corporation, received its
liquid assets, and sold them by prearranged plan to a third party
at capital gains rates.8 By this procedure, she avoided ordinary tax
treatment on a dividend from United Mortgage Corporation."
Possibly assuming that Congress had overlooked the potential
for tax avoidance under the statute, the Board of Tax Appeals held
that Mrs. Gregory's literal compliance with the statute caused the
transaction to be tax-free. 10 Disagreeing, the Supreme Court held
that distributions pursuant to corporate divisions motivated by tax
avoidance and lacking in business purpose must be deemed dividends under the spirit of the statute."
By the time the Supreme Court reversed the Tax Board's decision in 1935, Congress had already reacted to that decision in denominating all spin-off distributions dividends, regardless of
whether the motivation was business purpose or tax avoidance.12
By 1951, however, Congress had recognized the economic inefficiency of continuing the preferred status of split-offs and split-ups,
where abuses had continued to occur," while denying such status
7. 293 U.S. at 467.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. "A statute so meticulously drafted must be interpreted as a literal expression of the
taxing policy, and leaves only the small interstices for judicial consideration." 27 B.T.A. at
225.
11. 293 U.S. at 469-70.
12. H.R. RaP. No. 704, 73d Cqng., 2d Sess. 12 (1934); S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
13 (1934). For congressional discussion following House Ways and Means Committee and
Senate Finance Committee reports, see 78 CONG. REC. 5847, 5864, 5960 (1934). The House
Ways and Means Committee clearly stated congressional intent behind the statutory
revision.
[T]he committee recommends that section 112(g) be omitted from the bill. This paragraph provides that a corporation by means of a reorganization may distribute to its
shareholders stock or securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization
without any tax to the shareholder. By this method corporations have found it possible to pay what would otherwise be taxable dividends, without any taxes upon their
shareholders. The committee believes that this means of avoidance should be ended.
H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
13. See, e.g., Spangler v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 976 (1952) (dividend treatment accorded
spin-offs not applicable where taxpayer has literally complied with tax-free provisions for
split-off). Accord, Rev. Rul. 53-289, 1953-2 C.B. 37. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277,
§ 115(h), 48 Stat. 712 (current version at I.R.C. § 355); Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209,
§§ 112(b)(3), (g), (i)(1)(D), (i)(2), 47 Stat. 196 (tax-free reorganizations) (replaced by Reve-
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to spin-offs. 14 Consequently, Congress restored the spin-off to grace
and added two safeguards.1 5 The first safeguard was the post-distribution "two active businesses" rule, whereby both the distributing and distributed corporations must continue in the active conduct of a trade or business after the spin-off.16 The second
safeguard was the "device clause," under which the prompt sale of
distributed stock, especially where prearranged, created a pre17
sumption that the spin-off was a pretext for a dividend.
By 1953 the Treasury Department had well established an extremely liberal regulatory interpretation of the 1951 revision.' s For
nus Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 115(h), 48 Stat. 712).
14. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1951).
15. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 317(a), 65 Stat. 493 (current version at I.R.C. § 355).
16. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 112(b)(11), 65 Stat. 493 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 355) provided as follows:
Distribution of Stock not in Liquidation-If there is distributed, in pursuance of a
plan of reorganization, to a shareholder of a corporation which is a party to the reorganization, stock (other than preferred stock) in another corporation which is a party
to the reorganization, without the surrender by such shareholder of stock, no gain to
the distributee from the receipt of such stock shall be recognized unless it appears
that (A) any corporation which is a party to such reorganization was not intended to
continue the active conduct of a trade or business after such reorganization, or (B)
the corporation whose stock is distributed was used principally as a device for the
distribution of earnings and profits to the shareholders of any corporation a party to
the reorganization.
Senator Hubert Humphrey's remarks contain an example of the abuses at which this statutory revision was aimed:
Corporation A, claiming-some trumped up business purpose, would transfer the
cash and bonds to new corporation X, in exchange for X's stock, and then would
distribute X's stock to the stockholders of corporation A. After permitting a decent
interval to elapse, corporation X would be liquidated. Corporation X would thus be
set up by means of funds obtained from the operations of corporation A. The stockholders of corporation A would have all the stock in the new corporation X.
The stockholders would receive the cash and bonds in liquidation-which transaction gives rise to a capital gain, rather than to ordinary income; or the stockholders
could merely sell their stock and "cash in" on their dividend at capital gain rates.
Paragraphs (A) and (B) [of section 112(b)(11)] prevent this type of avoidance by
requiring that in order for the distribution of stock in corporation X to be tax-free,
both corporations A and X must be intended to carry on active business after the
reorganization.
96 CONG. REC. 13685 (1950) (remarks of Senator Humphrey concerning section 207(a) of
Senate Finance Committee Bill which in 1951 became section 112(b)(11) of the 1939 Code).
17. See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1951).
18. The regulation stated that the "underlying assumption of section 112(b)(11) . . .is
that the reorganization and distribution of stock must result in a continuation of the old
business activities and in a continuation of the interests of the shareholders therein." Tress.
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example, under the regulation, the new corporation could qualify
shareholders for tax-free treatment by remaining in business for
any limited amount of time.1" Such a statutory construction merely
pointed up Congress' failure to specify in any of its enactments to
that date its intent that a valid business purpose underlie every
tax-free corporate division and distribution.
II. THE 1954 CODE: SECTION 355
Partly in response to the Treasury Department's misinterpretation of its intent, Congress overhauled its piecemeal provisions in
1954.20 The new provision eliminated the requirement that divisions occur pursuant to a plan of reorganization, 21 accorded virtually identical treatment to each of the three types of divisions,22
Reg. 118, § 39.112(b)(11)(2)(a) (1954).
19. The Treasury Department's example of this assumption is as follows:
Corporation C owns and operates a department store. It decides to provide parking
facilities for the customers of the store. In order to provide such facilities, Corporation C enters into a contract to purchase land adjacent to its premises. The purchase
price of the land is $100,000 and it is estimated that the cost of developing the parking lot will be $50,000. In order to separate the operations of the parking lot from
those of the department store, Corporation C transfers to a newly formed Corporation D $90,000 in cash and $90,000 in bonds, together with the contract for the
purchase of the land, in exchange for all the stock of Corporation D, which stock is
distributed pro rata among the shareholders of Corporation C. The purchase of the
land is completed on the date fixed in the contract, and the parking facilities are
developed and operated by Corporation D. There are no other relevant facts. The
transfer of the cash, bonds, and contract to Corporation D in exchange for its stock is
a reorganization under section 112(g)(1) and the distribution of stock (other than
preferred stock) in Corporation D to the shareholders bf Corporation C is within the
terms of Section 112(b)(11).
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.112(b)(11)(2)(d), ex. 2 (1953).
20. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, §§ 355, 356, 68A Stat. 113 (now I.R.C. §§ 355, 356).
21. I.R.C. § 355(a)(2)(C). Under the 1954 Code, a corporate division no longer necessitated the distribution of the transfer corporation shares. Moreover, there was no longer any
necessity for transferring property to a controlled corporation before distributing the stock
of a pre-existing subsidiary. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in
[1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4681.
22. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 266, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4621, 4903. (Senate Finance Committee reporting that section 355 incorporates
the 1939 Code provisions regarding split-ups, split-offs, and spin-offs). If the transaction
fails to meet section 355 requirements, the results are not similar. Split-ups and split-offs
likely will receive capital gain treatment under sections 302, 331, or 346; whereas, spin-offs
will receive section 301 ordinary tax treatment. See generally I.R.C. § 356; B. BrrrKEn and
J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 13.03 (4th ed.
1979).
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and established the five requirements for tax-free status currently
found in the Code.2"
The five statutory requirements for tax-free qualification under
section 355 again suggest congressional intent that a valid business
purpose underlie the division and subsequent stock distribution
even though nowhere in the statute does Congress specify that intent.24 The first requirement is that one corporation, denominated
the distributing corporation under section 355, transfer assets to a
second corporation, denominated the distributed corporation, in
exchange for an amount of stock which constitutes "control" of the
distributed corporation. 25 Under a second requirement, the distributing corporation then must distribute to its shareholders the
stock and securities it owns in the distributed corporation. 2 A
third condition requires both the distributing corporation and the
distributed corporation to be engaged in the active conduct of a
trade or business immediately after the distribution. 7 Under a
fourth requirement, the distributing corporation must have carried
on the trades or businesses of both the distributing and the distributed corporations for the five years immediately preceding the
distribution.28 Moreover, neither trade nor business may have been
acquired directly or indirectly by either of these corporations
within the preceding five years through a transaction in which gain
or loss was recognized.2"
The remaining requirement contains the "device clause," which
was first seen in the 1951 revisions.30 This provision, which requires that the transaction not be used principally as a device to
23. For the full text of I.R.C. § 355, see App. I.
24. See App. I.
25. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(A). See App. I. I.R.C. § 368(a) defines "control" as ownership of at
least eighty per cent of the total voting power of all classes of stock and at least eighty per
cent of the total number of shares of all other classes.
26. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D). The transaction will qualify if the transferor corporation distributes an amount equaling control under section 368(c) and if the Commissioner is satisfied that no stock is retained for tax avoidance purposes. Id. See app. I.
27. I.R.C. § 355(b)(1)(A). See App. I.
28. LR.C. § 355(b)(2)(B). See App. I.
29. I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(C) and (D). See App. I.
30. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B). See App. L For discussion of the "device clause" requirement
under the 1951 revisions, see note 17 supra and accompanying text. For comparison of the
device clause to the business purpose test, see notes 34-53 infra and accompanying text.
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bail out the earnings and profits of either corporation, 3 is the
nearest equivalent to a congressional requirement of a valid business purpose to appear in section 355. Obviously, if a shareholder
sells the distributed stock or liquidates the new post-distribution
corporation by design arranged before the corporate division, he
quickly has converted his distribution into liquid form. Although
the transaction gives the appearance of a capital transaction, it is
in essence no more than a means for obtaining a dividend without
incurring liability at ordinary income rates. Consequently, section
355 now treats such behavior as evidence of a bail out device.3 2
Moreover, even if the shareholder has not prearranged the transaction, immediate sale or liquidation may present strong evidence of
such a device, as will a pro rata distribution to the shareholders."3
III.

NON-STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS: THE BUSINESS PURPOSE

TEST
In addition to the statutory requirements under section 355, the
Internal Revenue Service and the courts have imposed specialized
controls on section 355 transactions. The most significant of these
limitations is the business purpose doctrine, under which the
shareholder must show a valid business purpose for the division
and stock distribution in order to receive tax free treatment. Although the doctrine has been in existence since the Supreme
Court's 1935 decision in Gregory v. Helvering, several attendant
issues remain unresolved.
The issue of least consequence to the close corporation is that of
whether the business purpose test exists separately from or as a
part of the device test. Since the corporation and its few share31. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1) (1980).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1) (1980). The House bill, H.R. 8300, provided for dividend
treatment for shareholders who sold their distributed shares within ten years of receipt unless for five years the distributing corporation had conducted the distributed corporation's
trade or business, separate business records were maintained, and at least ninety per cent of
the distributed corporation's annual gross income was other than personal holding company
income. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 353(c) (1954). The Senate Finance Committee
rejected the House version. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51, reprintedin [1954]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4623, 4681-82. The proposed regulations also treat a "pro rata
or substantially pro rata" distribution as significant evidence of a device. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.355-2(c) (1980).
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holders are so closely interwoven in a close corporation, there may
be in reality little practical distinction between the operations of
the device test and the business purpose test. Two issues of extreme significance to the close corporation remain, however. The
first is whether a shareholder purpose can constitute a sufficient
business purpose for section 355 preferred status. The second concerns how to predict whether the asserted business purpose will
win official approval. Subsumed under this second issue is the
question of whether the asserted business purpose will support
both the division and the distribution of shares.
Lacking guidance from Congress, the distributee of a close corporation division faces an unreasonable choice. Typically, as both
shareholder and corporate officer, he may participate in a division
and stock distribution with little assurance that he can make the
requisite business purpose showing. Conversely, he may encourage
a deferral of the division, thereby risking a needless loss of corporate and economic benefit. Were a clearer statement of congressional intent forthcoming, what now proceeds as a transaction
sparked by guesswork could be reduced to a rational business decision between definite alternatives.
A.

Business Purpose Versus Device

In initially determining how to meet the business purpose requirement, the taxpayer must consider its relationship to the device test. Whereas the device test exists to prevent bail out by
monitoring shareholders' intended disposition of stock distributed
in a section 355 transaction, the business purpose test exists to police the transaction for bail out potential before it occurs. This
business purpose test, a product of judicial ' interpretation of congressional intent and the Internal Revenue Service 35, requires the
taxpayer to make an affirmative showing of a valid corporate purpose behind both the division and stock distribution. 6 Further,
whereas the device test appears to cause scrutiny for improperly
34. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.

35. The business purpose test first appeared in the regulations after the Gregory decision.
Treas. Reg. § 86 (1935). For the text of the current regulations, see note 51 infra.

36. For discussion of whether the purpose must be that solely of the corporation or that
of the shareholders, see notes 56-83 infra and accompanying text.
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motivated shareholder benefit, the business purpose test appears
to cause scrutiny for lack of business exigencies behind the transaction. Only in tandem do the two tests evoke a monitoring of the
entire spectrum of steps involved in a section 355 transaction.
Although the courts and the Service agree that tax-free status
hinges on meeting both tests, e they do not agree on whether the

tests exist separately or the business purpose test is included
within the device test. In the most prominent case, Commissioner
v. Wilson,"' the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court's allowance
of tax-free status in the spin-off of a financing corporation from a
retail furniture corporation and clearly denominated the tests as
separate requirements for section 355 purposes. The owners of the
furniture company had transferred the outstanding conditional
sales contracts to Wil-Plan, its own financing agency, in exchange
for all of the Wil-Plan stock." The Tax Court found the taxpayers'
alleged business reasons for spinning-off Wil-Plan insufficient.' °
The court allowed section 355 treatment, however, since it also
found that the taxpayers had not employed a device for tax avoidance purposes.' 1 Unable to hold that either finding was clearly erroneous, the Ninth Circuit squarely faced the issue of whether
each test must be met on its own merits. It held that Congress'
overriding purpose in enacting section 355, as discussed in Gregory,' was "to give to business enterprisers leeway in readjusting
their corporate arrangements to better suit their business purposes.' 3 Where no business purpose exists, the transaction cannot
be tax-free, irrespective of whether or not it was a bail out device."
Reaching the same result on different grounds, the First Circuit
37. See, e.g., Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767 (lst Cir. 1971); Rev. Rul. 59-197,
1959-1 C.B. 77, 79 ("There must be good business reasons for the transaction and it must
not be a device for the distribution of earnings and profits.").
38. 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'g 42 T.C. 914 (1964).
39. 353 F.2d at 185.
40. 42 T.C. at 922.
41. Id. at 923.
42. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.
43. 353 F.2d at 187. "If the rearrangement had that purpose, Congress was willing to
concede them some possible tax advantages. If the rearrangement had no business purpose,
let the taxes fall where they might." Id.
44. Id. at 187-88. Accord, Gada v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 859 (D. Conn. 1978).
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in Rafferty v. Commissioner 5 treated the business purpose test as
a step within the device test. Rafferty Brown Steel Company, Inc.
of Massachusetts had spun-off Teragram Realty Company, Inc.
and Rafferty Brown Steel Company, Inc. of Connecticut, distributing the new stock to the Massachusetts stockholders. 46 The Tax
Court disagreed with the Commissioner and found that "there was
no device because there was an adequate business purpose for the
separation and distribution of Teragram stock.'7 Agreeing with
the Tax Court on several grounds, 48 the First Circuit nevertheless
denied the taxpayer's preferred section 355 treatment. 49 In explanation, it stated:
The business purpose here alleged, which could be fully satisfied
by a bail-out of dividends, is not sufficient to prove that the transaction was not being principally so used.
Given such a purpose, the only question remaining is whether the
substance of the transaction is such as to leave the taxpayer in a
position to distribute the earnings and profits of the corporation
away from, or out of the business.50
The current and proposed regulations on this point offer limited
support for the Wilson view rather than that of Rafferty, since
they speak to the business purpose issue without discussion of the
device test. The current regulations disallow section 355 qualification to transactions "carried out for purposes not germane to the
business of the corporations," principally so as to limit readjustment "as is required by business exigencies." 51 The proposed regu45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972).
452 F.2d at 768-69.
Id. at 769.
For further discussion of Rafferty, see notes 69-72 infra and accompanying text.
452 F.2d at 771.
Id.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-2(c), .368-1(b) read in part as follows:
(c) Business purpose. The distribution by a corporation of stork or securities of a
controlled corporation to its shareholders with respect to its own stock or to its security holders in exchange for its own securities will not qualify under section 355 where
carried out for purposes not germane to the business of the corporation ....
[T]he
application of section 355 [is limited] to certain specified distributions or exchanges
with respect to the stock or securities of controlled corporations incident to such readjustment of corporate structures as is required by business exigencies ....

Sec-

tion 355 contemplates a continuity of the entire business enterprise under modified
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lation merely adds examples of qualifying and nonqualifying business purposes without referring to the device test.5 2 The Service's
position in Revenue Rulings to date appears to favor the Wilson
approach, 3 notwithstanding the fact that the issue has not been
presented squarely.
Arguably, the disagreement over whether the tests exist independently of each other or whether the business purpose showing is
subsumed under the device test may have created a distinction
without a difference. In practical terms the results in Wilson and
Rafferty are consistent. Moreover, in cases involving close corporations the shareholders and the corporation are so closely interwoven that the business purpose and device tests may seek the
same ends. The inherent danger in the Rafferty view, however, is
that the courts would alter the business purpose doctrine in an effort to make its target coextensive with that of the device test. In
so doing, the courts would be narrowing a doctrine created to monitor all phases of a transaction to a doctrine which governs only
shareholder motivation.
B. Predicting the Results: What Constitutes a Valid Business
Purpose?
The two issues of major importance which face the shareholders
and planners in close corporation section 355 transactions involve
the Service's and courts' definitions of business purpose. Despite
corporate forms and a continuity of interest in all or part of such business enterprise
on the part of those persons who, directly or indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise prior to the distribution or exchange....
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1980).
(b) Purpose. Under the general rule, upon the exchange of property, gain or loss
must be accounted for if the new property differs in a material particular, either in
kind or in extent, from the old property. The purpose of the reorganization provisions
of the Code is to except from the general rule certain specifically described exchanges
incident to such readjustments of corporate structures ....
Requisite to a reorganization under the Code are a continuity of the business enterprise under the modified
corporate form, and (except as provided in section 368(a) (1) (D)) a continuity of
interest therein on the part of those persons who, directly or indirectly, were the
owners of the enterprise prior to the reorganization.
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1980).
52. For the full text of the proposed regulation § 1.355-2(b), see App. II.
53. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 C.B. 77.
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its dramatic origin in Gregory,54 the business purpose doctrine has
engendered confusion in some areas. Indeed, in some cases, it has
produced little more than an amalgamation of case-by-case advice.
As a consequence, shareholders and planners may find themselves
unable to predict accurately whether a certain fact pattern will
qualify for preferred treatment under section 355.55
A review of the administrative and judicial decisions does disclose a pattern of which taxpayers and planners should be aware.
Once the taxpayer asserts a business purpose, the Service scrutinizes the transaction to determine whether the purpose is that of a
shareholder or the corporation. Although some courts have approved both, the Service has not acquiesced in the former. Secondly, the Service scrutinizes the transaction for its factual support of a business purpose for the division. The final scrutiny is of
the business purpose for the distribution of the stock. Of these
three steps, the second presents the least difficulties, while the
third presents the most.
1.

Corporate Versus Shareholder Purpose

The first business purpose obstacle facing a close corporation
shareholder or planner who seeks section 355 preferred status involves a determination of whether the alleged motivation for the
division must be a corporate purpose or whether it may be solely a
shareholder purpose. The courts and the Service have differed
strongly on this point.
The Second Circuit in Parshelsky's Estate v. Commissioner"
faced this issue squarely, holding that a shareholder's business reasons may suffice for section 355 purposes. There Parshelsky, the
sole shareholder of a lumber and millwork business, caused the
corporation to spin-off real estate and to distribute all of the new
stock to him.57 He alleged as the business purposes for the division
and the distribution of new stock three reasons tied only to the
corporation and one tied only to himself as the sole shareholder5 8
54. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.
55. For discussion on this point, see notes 112-30 infra and accompanying text.
56. 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962).
57. Id. at 15-16.
58. Id. at 16-17.
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As his shareholder purpose, he alleged that he wanted to devise the
real estate operations and remaining business separately.59 The
Tax Court held that the corporate purposes alleged were insufficient to confer section 355 tax-free status and that a shareholder
purpose never could qualify a transaction for such status.60 Reversing and remanding for consideration of the validity of the
shareholder purpose, the Second Circuit held that a shareholder
"personal non-tax-avoidance" purpose could so qualify the transaction. 1 Unfortunately for planners, however, the court did not
elucidate by examples of qualifying factual settings.
The Second Circuit noted that the Service" restricts the definition of business purpose to corporate purpose and that while court
decisions up to the mid-forties restricted it in similar fashion," the
judicial trend favors "an evaluation of all the non-tax-avoidance
motives of both the corporations and shareholders involved." According to the Second Circuit, the earlier judicial view which the
Service still embraces emanates from two misconceptions. 5 First,
the view assumes that the "business" purpose concept discussed in
Gregory denotes an exclusively corporate purpose, even though in
a close corporation corporate and shareholder benefit may be virtually indistinguishable. 6 The second misconception is that Congress' desire to promote economically beneficial corporate readjustments "for legitimate business purposes" precludes judicial and
Service approval in cases involving only shareholder purpose.6 In
reality, the court noted, congressional intent was "to provide for
nonrecognition.

. .

in cases which involve a mere rearrangement

of the corporate structure or other shifts in the form of the corporate enterprise which do not involve any distribution of corporate
59. Id. at 17, 21.
60. Id. at 17. See Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner,,34 T.C. 946, 951 (1960). The Tax
Court's decision was based on 26 U.S.C. § 112(b)(11) (1939), which is analogous to the present I.R.C. § 355.
61. 303 F.2d at 17.
62. Id. at 18 (citing Treas. Reg. 118, § 39-112(g)-2(g)).
63. Id. at 18 n.8.
64. 303 F.2d at 18.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 18-19.
67. Id. at 19.
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assets to shareholders."6 8 Without more, the Second Circuit
opined, one cannot reasonably infer that Congress intended to restrict business purpose to corporate rather than shareholder
purpose.
Taking a more moderate approach, the First Circuit stated in
Rafferty v. Commissioner" that the distinction between qualifying
and non-qualifying business purposes lies not in whether the motivation was that of the shareholder or the corporation, but whether
the reason was "germane to the continuance of the corporate business. '7 0 The First Circuit cautioned that it would not adopt what it
considered the Parshelsky court's suggested wholesale approval of
all shareholder investment purposes. 1 Instead, it would limit each
case to its facts.7 2 In so doing, however, the Rafferty court moved
no closer to a clear guideline on which close corporation shareholders and planners could rely when developing a section 355 transaction plan. In view of this weakness, the Service's view takes on
greater strength.
The Service's position consistently has been that a shareholder
purpose is an insufficient basis for tax-free treatment under section
355. The current regulations require purposes which are "germane
to the business of" the corporation and engendered by "business
exigencies. '7 3 In an obvious attempt to tighten this language, the
proposed regulations expressly preclude preferred treatment in
shareholder purpose cases unless the shareholder purpose is "so
nearly coextensive with a corporate business purpose as to preclude any distinction between them."7 4
Two significant illustrations of the Service's view are Revenue
Ruling 69-46075 and Revenue Ruling 75-337 76 In Revenue Ruling
69-460 the Service set forth three examples of corporate divisions
68.
1662,
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1954)). Accord, S. REP. No.
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
452 F.2d at 770.
Id. (quoting Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 647 (1st Cir. 1949)).
452 F.2d at 770.
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1980). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1980).
Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1) (1980).
1969-2 C.B. 51.
1975-2 C.B. 124.
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and attendant stock distributions." In answer to the business purpose questions raised by each example, the Service emphasized the
requirement of a corporate purpose.7 s Its unmistakable position

was that approved purposes emanate solely from "reasons germane
to corporate business problems
and necessary for the future con9
duct of the business.

7'

In Revenue Ruling 75-337, however, the Service modified its position, sanctioning a shareholder purpose which was fully coextensive with a corporate purpose. There, the manager and fifty-three
percent shareholder of a franchised automobile dealership caused
the corporation to distribute the stock of a wholly-owned subsidiary to two inactive shareholders in exchange for their dealership
shares.8 0 The alleged corporate purpose was to ensure continuation
of the franchise which required either a group of shareholders each
of which was an active shareholder or a majority shareholder.81
The obvious shareholder purpose was to transmit profitable business operations by devise to the majority shareholder's five daughters. 2 Since this purpose was coextensive with a valid corporate
purpose, the Service approved the transaction. 8 It did so, however,
solely on corporate purpose grounds.
In developing a section 355 transaction plan, the close corporation shareholder or planner should be familiar with the Second
Circuit's reasoning in Parshelsky. In developing an evidentiary
background, however, a shareholder or planner must be aware that
the only safe route is one in which a corporate business purpose is
either the singular or the dominant alleged motivation for the division and distribution.
2.

Approved Business Purposes

Once the close corporation shareholder or planner is satisfied
that the alleged motivation for the division and distribution is
77.
78.
79.
80.

1969-2 C.B. at 52.
Id.
Id.
1975-2 C.B. 124.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 125.
83. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1) (1980).
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fully coextensive with or is solely a corporate purpose, a determination must be made as to whether the purpose can qualify as a
valid business purpose. Throughout this analysis the planner must
be aware of two factors, which, if ignored, may preclude tax-free
treatment under section 355. The first factor is that the decisions
on business purpose validity questions tend to fall into the categories of voluntarily or involuntarily motivated divisions and distributions. While involuntarily motivated transactions gain approval
virtually without question, those which are voluntarily motivated
attract official scrutiny. The second factor is that the alleged business purposes for the transaction must support both the corporate
division and the subsequent distribution of stock to its shareholders.8 4 Although this concept constitutes the core of section 355, it
equally constitutes the most elusive concept because of the Service's tendency to define it through facile examples.8 5
Of all the possible business purposes behind a section 355 transaction, compliance with antitrust laws or decrees is the one purpose which will gain approval without invoking official scrutiny.
8 have illustrated
Both Congress" and the Treasury DepartmentV7
the valid business purpose concept with this example. In such a
situation the corporation involuntarily segregates one business operation from the others and divests itself of all or part of the stock
pursuant to official requirements.
The Service, apparently considering involuntariness central to
the issue, has extended this category of approval to include compliance with other federal regulatory provisions. In Revenue Ruling
75-321 s8 the Service approved a transaction in which a corporation
engaged in several areas of business divested itself pursuant to federal banking regulations of all but five percent ownership in a
wholly owned subsidiary. In this ruling, the narrow point of which
went to the issue of whether a valid business purpose underlay the
stock distribution, the Service also made clear its favorable dispo84. For a general discussion of business purpose supporting both the division and distribution, see notes 112-30 infra and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 167 (1954).
87. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2), ex. 1. See App. II.
88. 1975-2 C.B. 123.
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sition toward involuntary divestiture stemming from federal regulations. Extending this principle, the Service also has approved
transactions undertaken to prevent the expropriation of assets contained in foreign subsidiaries. 89 Further extension of this category
may include those segregations which are required by state and local law. 90
Outside of this involuntariness category, however, lies a spectrum of business purposes with which a close corporation shareholder or planner must be thoroughly familiar in order to predict
successfully the likelihood of favorable section 355 treatment.
While each case turns on its peculiar facts, five discernible patterns
appear among voluntary transaction cases. These patterns include
reasonable business responses to pressures outside of the corporation, management and personnel friction reduction measures, responses to shareholder pressure, transactions to enable a subsidiary to engage in a reorganization, and segregation of a risky
business operation to insulate a stable operation.
a. Reasonable Business Responses to External Pressures
The first pattern, reasonable business responses to external pressures, consistently has evoked official approval. In Revenue Ruling
77-2291 the Service approved tax-free treatment for a parent corporation's distribution of subsidiary stock to the parent's shareholder
where the business purpose was to maintain their necessary flow of
business capital from a local bank. When the bank conditioned the
continuation of former borrowing limits upon the complete
financial segregation of these operations, the parent responded
with a distribution which the Service denominated "germane to
the business of the corporation." 2 Similarly, in Revenue Ruling
76-1879- the Service upheld as a valid business purpose a parent
corporation's establishment of a new corporation to which the parent subsequently distributed all of the stock of a subsidiary to ef89. Rev. Rul. 78-383, 1978-2 C.B. 142.
90. B. BITTKER & J. EIUSTICE, FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-

13.09 (4th ed. 1980).
91. 1977-1 C.B. 91.
92. Id.
93. 1976-1 C.B. 97. See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1). See App. II.
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fect "a substantial reduction in the amount of state and local
taxes." Additionally, in Revenue Ruling 75-33794 the Service allowed tax-free status to a transaction to remove inactive shareholders and thereby ensure compliance with the franchise
agreement.
The final component to the pattern of reasonable responses to
external pressures is comprised of customer objections to an existing integration of operations. The Service in Revenue Rulings
59-1979s and 59-450" clearly has sanctioned section 355 transactions where customers strongly object to one corporation's operation of wholesale distribution to them while engaging in the retail
market in direct competition with them. In addition, the Tax
Court in Lester v. Commissioner97 approved the spin-off to separate an automobile parts supply warehousing business from a retail
and service station parts business. The approved business reasons
were area warehousing operation customers' objections over having
to compete with the same company at the retail level and a growing concern that the dual operations could constitute a fair trade
practices violation.9 8
Although each of these cases turns on its peculiar facts, the close
corporation shareholders or planners should be able to rely on the
principle that, where external pressures are such that a reasonable
businessman would choose no solution other than a division and
distribution of shares, the valid business purpose requirement is
satisfied.
b. Business Decisions Made to Reduce Employee Discontent
The second pattern of valid purposes within the involuntary segregation and distribution cases involves business decisions made to
reduce potentially explosive employee discontent. The close corporation planner or shareholder should be aware that section 355
94. 1975-2 C.B. 124. For discussion of the facts in this case see notes 76-83 supra and
accompanying text.
95. 1959-1 C.B. 77 (customer objection to brokerage of products similar to those it

manufactures).
96. 1959-2 C.B. 201 (split-up of corporation containing printing business and typesetting

and electrotyping business where customers of former in direct competition with latter).
97. 40 T.C. 947 (1963).
98. Id. at 949.
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preferred status under this pattern may require more extensive
fact gathering.
In Boettger v. Commissioner,99 the Tax Court approved a section
355 transaction to squelch one management faction's severe dissatisfaction with another faction's performance. In Olson v. Commissioner'00 the Tax Court approved the segregation of two department stores into separate corporations "to contain [the severe
labor] difficulties. . . and to avoid to the extent possible a spread
of union organizing attempt[s]." 10 1 Similarly, the Tax Court in Badanes v. Commissioner,1 2 approved a split-up where the two owners, who functioned also as management, demonstrated that they
"could no longer agree between themselves as to the proper means
for advancing their common business interests." 10 3 Following this
pattern, the Service consistently has approved split-ups where
owners who act as management cannot coordinate their ideas regarding policy.1 In planning a section 355 transaction on this basis, the close corporation shareholder or planner should note that
the focal point in these decisions appears to be a level of discord
capable of seriously disrupting normal business operations.
This pattern also consists of those cases in which the corporation
precipitates a section 355 transaction to provide dissatisfied management with increased responsibility or with a share of the corporate ownership. In Revenue Ruling 56-451,105 the Service condoned
a separation to elevate management and concomitantly to expand
the business operations. Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 59-197,101 it
allowed tax-free treatment to a key employee who demanded an
opportunity to buy into the business. Although these rulings do
not emphasize the existence of discord which causes the demands,
close corporation shareholders or planners who intend to utilize
this avenue for tax-free status would be foolhardy in failing to
99. 51 T.C. 324 (1968) ( § 355 status denied on other grounds pursuant to five-year rule).
100. 48 T.C. 855 (1967).
101. Id. at 868.
102. 39 T.C. 410 (1962).
103. Id. at 415. See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2), ex. 2. See App. II.
104. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-237, 1973-1 C.B. 185; Rev. Rul. 72-320, 1972-1 C.B. 270; Rev.
Rul. 56-655, 1956-2 C.B. 214.
105. 1956-2 C.B. 208.
106. 1959-1 C.B. 77.
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gather such evidence.
c. Reasonable Business Responses to Shareholder Pressure
The third pattern, comprised of reasonable business responses to
shareholder pressure, may provide the close corporation shareholder or planner stable guidance in formulating a successful section 355 transaction as do the management cases. Two major revenue rulings demonstrate that the Service's position on shareholder
pressure is virtually identical to its position on management discord. Considering the interwoven roles of management and equity
holder in most close corporations, this position appears sound.
Revenue Ruling 56-117107 resulted from a division and distribution after shareholder dissatisfaction with management's performance and operational policies had become "so pronounced that the
shareholders concluded that they could not continue the united
ownership" of the corporation. 108 Although less tumultuous, the
facts behind Revenue Ruling 56-344109 qualified the stockholders
for tax-free treatment. There, the corporation, which handled and
marketed turkeys, opened a branch to handle chickens also. 11°
Subsequent increases in competition led to shareholder division
over whether to discontinue branch operations. For this business
reason, the corporation spun-off the branch operation and received
the Service's approval."" The ruling is peculiar in that the Service
did not discuss the level of shareholder discord. Although one possible conclusion is that proof of severe disharmony is unnecessary,
Revenue Ruling 56-117 and the analogous rulings concerning management dissatisfaction militate against so facile a resolution. Consequently, close corporation stockholders or planners who intend
to employ this aspect of the business purpose concept should be
prepared to make the stronger showing of management or shareholder discord which disrupts normal operations.
107. 1956-1 C.B. 180.

108. Id. at 181.
109. 1956-2 C.B. 195.
110. Id. at 196.
111. Id.
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Segregation of a Business to Facilitate Reorganization

The fourth pattern which arises among voluntary division and
distribution cases involves the segregation of a business so as to
facilitate participation in a subsequent reorganization. Two types
of cases arise under this pattern. In the first type, division and distribution occur in related transactions. In the second type, however, distribution is unrelated to the division. Curiously, the Service's position on these cases appears to be to grant preferred
section 355 status, even though the subsequent reorganization easily could be arranged as part of a pretext for a bail out.
Commissioner v. Morris Trust 112 illustrates the first type of case,
in which division and distribution occur in related transactions.
American Commercial Bank, which operated an insurance department in addition to its banking divisions, negotiated a merger with
Security National Bank of Greensboro, North Carolina. 113 To avoid
a violation of national banking laws, American spun-off its insurance department, distributing the new stock to its shareholders
before attempting the merger.1 14 The Fourth Circuit, in finding
that national banking law requirements supported both the division and the distribution, held that the distribution was tax-free
under section 355.115
Revenue Ruling 76-527111 illustrates the second type of case in
which the distribution is unrelated to the division. There, the Service allowed tax-free treatment to a parent corporation engaged in
the construction materials business which distributed all of its
stock in its television broadcasting subsidiary so that an unrelated
broadcasting company would agree to acquisition by the subsidiary. In finding a valid business purpose, the Service determined
that "to allow (the subsidiary) to use its own stock in the acquisition of the assets of (the unrelated corporation) it was necessary to
separate the television broadcasting business of (the subsidiary)
from the dominant reputation of the construction materials pro112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 795.
Id. at 795-96.
Id. at 799, 802.
1976-2 C.B. 103.
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duction business of (the parent) in the investment community.

779
'117

Employing the same theme in Revenue Ruling 72-530,111 the

Service opened the door to severe abuse through the business purpose doctrine. There, the parent corporation conducted a warehousing business and the subsidiary was engaged in the transportation business. An unrelated corporation, which conducted
warehousing operations, entered negotiations to merge with the
parent. Since the merger would strengthen the parent's competitive position in the market, the parent acquiesced in the unrelated
corporation shareholders' demand that the parent promise them a
post-merger one-half equity interest in the parent. To accomplish
this purpose, the parent distributed its subsidiary stock to the parent shareholders. The Service found the distribution tax-free, noting that the only alternative, placing the parent and the unrelated
corporation in a newly formed corporation, would have subjected
the new corporation to "severe state licensing requirements." 19
Close corporation shareholders and planners should become adept at developing the opportunities these rulings present. A parent
corporation which is able to negotiate a transaction like that in
Revenue Rulings 72-530 or 76-527 may allege that it wants to limit
its shareholders' post-merger interest in the unrelated corporation.
Conversely, the parent may be able to build an evidentiary background to demonstrate that the unrelated corporation prefers this
arrangement or one similar to that involved in Revenue Ruling 76527. Using such a purpose as background, the parent could distribute its subsidiary stock, thereby effectively bailing out subsidiary earnings and profits with full Service approval of a business
purpose.1

20

e. Segregation of a Risky Business from a Stable Business
The Service's position on this point appears even more anomalous in view of its concentration of the fifth case pattern, the segregation of a risky business from a stable business. Although the Ser117. Id.
118. 1972-2 C.B. 212.
119. Id.
120. Although such a transaction arguably could raise the device test issue, one might
infer that the Service's approval of like transactions indicates that it is not a device.
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vice has invested an inordinate amount of effort in defining when
it will deny tax-free status to a distribution it considers unnecessary in accomplishing the alleged business purpose, it in fact has
succeeded only in creating unwarranted uncertainty.
A comparison of examples from revenue rulings and a proposed
regulation illustrates yet another unsatisfactory approach to section 355 transactions. In the proposed regulation example,'21 a corporation attempts to shield its candy business from the viscissitudes of the novelty toy business by spinning off the toy business.
The Service would disallow favored tax treatment here, since the
protective purpose is accomplished as soon as the corporation has
transferred the toy business to a separate corporation.' 22 Were the
corporation simply to segregate the candy business and hold its
newly issued stock, toy business creditors easily could reach the
candy business. In such a case, then, the alleged valid business
purpose underlies both the division and the distribution, as is
required. 123
Revenue Ruling 56-554124 supports this view. There, a bank
wholly owned a subsidiary, which held land and other assets primarily for leasing. To segregate the speculative land operations
from the stable operations, the bank directors transferred all of the
subsidiary's assets except the land to a new corporation and distributed the newly issued stock to its shareholders. Sanctioning
tax-free treatment, the Service found as follows:
The continued indirect ownership of the land had caused the directors of the bank much concern because of the highly speculative
value of the land. They did not consider it desirable to continue to
operate a wholly-owned subsidiary which owned and managed real
estate. In addition, the uncertain value of the subsidiary's stock had
hindered the expansion of the bank. From time to time, the bank's
directors had considered increasing the capital stock of the bank by
issuing and selling additional stock. Also, the uncertain value of the
subsidiary corporation's stock presented a problem with respect to
121.
122.
123.
124.

Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2), ex. 3. See App. II.
Id.
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965).
1956-2 C.B. 198.
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the expansion of the bank through mergers with other banks. 125
Thus, the Service appears to favor tax-free treatment pursuant
to the segregation of a risky business from a stable business where
the stable business is transferred to a new corporation. From such
cases, the obvious corollary is that a distribution may be taxable if
the transaction accomplishes the business purpose without requiring that the shareholders directly own both corporations. The difficulty in close corporation shareholders' and planners' extension of
this principle beyond those cases which present exactly these facts,
however, is that the Service has not consistently applied the corollary to different fact patterns.
Revenue Ruling 69-460126 demonstrates the difficulty. In an attempt to pinpoint when a valid business purpose supported both
the division and distribution so as to accord tax-free status, the
Service set out three examples. The first involved the split-up of a
corporation in which the two shareholders, who also functioned as
management, have become so antagonistic toward each other that
the usual business operations suffer. Obviously, in such a case, the
business purpose supports both the division and distribution.
The third example in Revenue Ruling 69-460 sets out an equally
simple case. One shareholder owns the parent corporation, which
owns eighty-five percent of the subsidiary. The manager of the
subsidiary demands the right to purchase a share in the subsidiary.
To accomplish a valid business purpose,127 the sole shareholder
causes the parent to distribute the subsidiary stock to him, following which he sells some of the stock to the subsidiary's manager.
As in the first example, the distribution is wholly unrelated to the
28
accomplishment of the business purpose.
The planning difficulty, however, arises in cases such as the second example in Revenue Ruling 69-460. There, the parent owns all
125. Id.
126. 1969-2 C.B. 51. For a discussion of the Service's position in cases in which management demands an increased share of the business, see notes 75-79 supra and accompanying
text.
127. For discussion of management demands, see notes 99-106 supra and accompanying
text.
128. 1969-2 C.B. at 52.
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of the stock of the subsidiary. As a needed incentive, the parent
agrees to sell management part of its stock. To prevent management from obtaining any interest in the subsidiary, however, the
parent distributes the subsidiary stock to the parent's shareholders
before selling the parent stock. 129 The Service approves the need
for the distribution on these facts, 13 0 despite the fact that there are

alternative, if cumbersome, ways of accomplishing the business
purpose without a distribution. Following the first and third examples in this ruling, one could infer that official sanction turns on
whether or not the purpose can be achieved without a distribution.
If read together, the proposed regulation and Revenue Ruling 56554 suggest, however, that tax-free status turns only upon the
method actually chosen. Such a reading is unlikely in view of the
obvious abuse it would engender. Since it is unsettled, however,
the close corporation shareholder and planner must approach a
factually similar transaction with 'extreme caution.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Congress' inartful attempt under the 1954 Code to preclude taxfree treatment for bail out transactions under section 355 has fostered a significant degree of confusion. The unmistakable congressional intent behind the corporate division and distribution enact.ments since 1918 has been to encourage economic efficiency and
growth. Nevertheless, Congress' repeated decisions to leave the
definition of valid business purposes to the courts and the Service
has stimulated inefficiency through hesitancy and uncertainty.
In devising a section 355 transaction, the close corporation
shareholder or planner should expect to evoke certain standard official responses and must be prepared to support the transaction
from both device and business purpose standpoints. The shareholder or planner must be aware of judicial and Service disagreement over whether a shareholder purpose is a sufficient motivation
and be prepared to argue a corporate purpose and be familiar with
the fact patterns which have won approval as supported by a valid
business purpose and attempt to conform the facts to them as
nearly as is possible.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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What the close corporation planner cannot expect, however, is to
predict with any certainty whether the transaction will achieve
tax-free status if the purpose could have been accomplished without a distribution of the stock. Lacking guidance from Congress
and consistent decisions from the Service, the planner who faces
non-classical facts must risk a denial of tax-free treatment or
forego an economically efficient corporate division. In either case,
the price is indefensibly high for both the economy and the business community.
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APPENDIX I
SEC. 355. DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK AND SECURITIES OF A CONTROLLED
CORPORATION

(a) EFFECT ON DISTRIBUTEES. (1) GENERAL RULE. -If-

(A) a corporation (referred to in this section as the "distributing corporation")(i) distributes to a shareholder, with respect to its stock, or
(ii) distributes to a security holder, in exchange for its securities, solely stock or securities of a corporation (referred
to in this section as "controlled corporation") which it controls immediately before the distribution,
(B) the transaction was not used principally as a device for
the distribution of the earnings and profits of the distributing
corporation or the controlled corporation or both (but the
mere fact that subsequent to the distribution stock or securities in one or more of such corporations are sold or exchanged
by all or some of the distributees (other than pursuant to an
arrangement negotiated or agreed upon prior to such distribution) shall not be construed to mean that the transaction was
used principally as such a device),
(C) the requirements of subsection (b) (relating to active businesses) are satisfied, and
(D) as part of the distribution, the distributing corporation
distributes(i) all of the stock and securities in the controlled corporation held by it immediately before the distribution, or
(ii) an amount of stock in the controlled corporation constituting control within the meaning of section 368(c), and it
is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the
retention by the distributing corporation of stock (or stock
and securities) in the controlled corporation was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of Federal income tax,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to (and no amount
shall be includible in the income of) such shareholder or security holder on the receipt of such stock or securities.
(2) NON PRO RATA DISTRIBUTIONS, ETC. - Paragraph (1) shall be
applied without regard to the following:
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(A) whether or not the distribution is pro rata with respect to
all of the shareholders of the distributing corporation,
(B) whether or not the shareholder surrenders stock in the
distributing corporation, and
(C) whether or not the distribution is in pursuance of a plan
of reorganization (within the meaning of section 368(a)(1)
(D)).
(3) LIMITATIONS.(A) EXCESS PRINCIPAL AMOUNT - Paragraph (1) shall not apply if(i) the principal amount of the securities in the controlled
corporation which are received exceeds the principal
amount of the securities which are surrendered in connection with such distribution, or
(ii) securities in the controlled corporation are received and
no securities are surrendered in connection with such
distribution.
(B) STOCK ACQUIRED IN TAXABLE TRANSACTIONS WITHIN 5
YEARS TREATED AS

BOOT -

For purposes of this section (other

than paragraph (1)(D) of this subsection) and so much of section 356 as relates to this section, stock of a controlled corporation acquired by the distributing corporation by reason of
any transaction(i) which occurs within 5 years of the distribution of such
stock, and
(ii) in which gain or loss was recognized in whole or in part,
shall not be treated as stock of such controlled corporation,
but as other property.
(C) PROPERTY ATTRIBUTABLE TO ACCRUED INTEREST-Neither

paragraph (1) nor so much of section 356 as relates to paragraph (1) shall apply to the extent that any stock, securities,
or other property received is attributable to interest which has
accrued on securities on or after the beginning of the holder's
holding period.
(4) CROSS REFERENCES.(A) For treatment of the exchange if any property is received
which is not permitted to be received under this subsection
(including an excess principal amount of securities received
over securities surrendered, but not including property to

UNIVERSITY

OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:757

which paragraph (3)(c) applies) see section 356.
(B) For treatment of accrued interest in the case of an exchange described in paragraph (3)(c), see section 61.
(b) REQUIREMENTS AS TO ACTIVE BUSINESS.(1) IN GENERAL.-Subsection (a) shall apply only if either(A) the distributing corporation, and the controlled corporation (or, if stock of more than one controlled corporation is
distributed, each of such corporations), is engaged immediately after the distribution in the active conduct of a trade or
business, or
(B) immediately before the distribution, the distributing corporation had no assets other than stock or securities in the
controlled corporations and each of the controlled corporations is engaged immediately after the distribution in the active conduct of a trade or business.
(2) DEFINITION.-For purposes of paragraph (1), a corporation
shall be treated as engaged in the active conduct of a trade or
business if and only if(A) it is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business,
or substantially all of its assets consist of stock and securities
of a corporation controlled by it (immediately after the distribution) which is so engaged,
(B) such trade or business has been actively conducted
throughout the 5-year period ending on the date of the
distribution,
(C) such trade or business was not acquired within the period
described in subparagraph (B) in a transaction in which gain
or loss was recognized in whole or in part, and
(D) control of a corporation which (at the time of acquisition
of control) was conducting such trade or business(i) was not acquired directly (or through one or more corporations) by another corporation within the period described
in subparagraph (B), or
(ii) was so acquired by another corporation within such
period, but such control was so acquired only by reason of
transactions in which gain or loss was not recognized in
whole or in part, or only by reason of such transactions
combined with acquisitions before the beginning of such
period.
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APPENDIX II
Proposed Regulation § 1.355-2(b) reads as follows:
(b) Business purpose and continuity of interest. (1) In general.
A distribution by a corporation of stock or securities of a controlled corporation to its shareholders with respect to its own
stock or to its security holders in exchange for its own securities
will qualify under section 355 only if carried out for real and
substantial nontax reasons germane to the business of the corporations. The principal reason for this requirement is to provide
nonrecognition treatment only to those distributions or exchanges of stock or securities of the controlled corporation which
are incident to such readjustment of corporate structures as is
required by business exigencies and which effect only a readjustment of continuing interests in property under modified corporate forms. Depending upon the facts of a particular case, a
shareholder purpose for a transaction may be so nearly coextensive with a corporate business purpose as to preclude any distinction between them. In such a case, the transaction is carried
out for purposes germane to the business of the corporations. On
the other hand, if a transaction is motivated solely by the personal reasons of a shareholder, for example, if a transaction is
undertaken solely for the purpose of fulfilling the personal planning purposes of a shareholder, the distribution will not qualify
under section 355 since it is not carried out for purposes germane to the business of the corporaton. Section 355 contemplates a continuity of interest in all or part of the business enterprise prior to the distribution or exchange. For rules with
respect to the requirement of a business purpose for a transfer
of assets to a controlled corporation in connection with a reorganization described in section 368(a)(1)(D), see § 1.368-1(b).
(2) Examples. The provisions of paragraph (b) (1) of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:
Example (1). Corporation P is engaged in the production,
transportation, and refining of petroleum products. In 1962, P
acquired all of the properties of corporation S, which was also
engaged in the production, transportation, and refining of petroleum products. In 1968, as a result of anti-trust litigation,
P was ordered to divest itself of all properties acquired from
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S. P proposes to transfer assets acquired from S to a new corporation and to distribute the stock of such new corporation
to its shareholders. In view of the divestiture order, the distribution of the stock of the new corporation to the shareholders
of P will be considered to have been carried out for a real and
substantial nontax reason germane to the business of the
corporations.
Example (2). Corporation R owns and operates two men's
retail clothing stores. The outstanding stock of R is owned
equally by two brothers, A and B, and F, their father, who
does not take an active part in the retail clothing business. A
and B no longer can agree on major decisions affecting the
operation of the corporation. Corporation R proposes to transfer one store to a new corporation and distribute 66.7 percent
of the stock of such new corporation to one brother in exchange for all of his R stock. The other 33.3 percent of the
stock of such new corporation will be exchanged for one-half
of F's stock of corporation R. In view of the disagreement between managing shareholders, the distribution of the stock of
the new corporation will be considered to have been carried
out for a real and substantial nontax reason germane to the
business of the corporations.
Example (3). Corporation T is engaged in the manufacture
and sale of children's novelty toys. It also manufactures and
sells candy and candy products. The shareholders wish to separate the candy business from the risks and vicissitudes of the
novelty toy business. It is proposed that the assets and activities associated with the toy business be transferred to a new
corporation, the stock of which would then be distributed to
T's shareholders. The purpose of protecting the candy business from the risks of the novelty toy business, which is fulfilled when the novelty toy assets and activities are transferred to the new corporation, does not satisfy the
requirement there be a substantial nontax reason, germane to
the business of the corporation, for the distribution of the
stock of the new corporation to the shareholders.
Example (4). The facts are the same as in example (3) except that T also requires outside financing in order to substantially expand its candy business. As a condition of the
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loan, in order to prevent the potential diversion of funds to
the toy business, the lender requires the separation of the
candy business and the novelty toy business and the distribution of the stock of the novelty toy corporation to the shareholders. The lender's requirements are based upon customary
business practice. In this case, the distribution of the stock of
the novelty toy corporation to the shareholders will be considered to have been carried out for a real and substantial nontax
reason germane to the business of the corporations.

